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INTRODUCTION
This paper attempts to combine two different strands of the labour economics literature. First, there is now a growing literature on the economic impact of disability.
The rate of disability among the working age population ranges considerably among EU member states, from 6.6% in Italy to 32.2% in Finland in 2002 (Jones, Latreille and Sloane, 2007) . This makes it numerically much more important, for instance, than membership of various ethnic minorities in most countries, an issue on which there is a much more extensive literature. Employment rates for the disabled are much lower than for the non-disabled, varying among OECD countries in the late 1990s for those of working age from 20.8% in Poland against 71.2% for the non-disabled, to 62.2% in Switzerland against 79.1% for the non-disabled. Understanding the reasons for this and for the disability earnings gap has preoccupied much of the existing literature. A second strand of literature has examined skill mismatch, first concentrating on overeducation (and to a lesser extent undereducation), and finding that there are pay 1 Assuming that those who report no work limitations do not have lower productivity as a result of their health impairment compared to the non-disabled, one can interpret the unexplained residual in an Oaxaca-type decomposition as an estimate of discrimination.
3 penalties to being overeducated (see Sloane, Battu and Seaman, 1999) The relationship between education or skill mismatch and disability in the labour market has generally been ignored in the earlier literature, even to the extent of not always controlling for disability in the regression analysis. 2 One recent exception to this is Blazquez and Malo (2005) who use Spanish data from the European Community Household Panel 1995-2000. They, however, find no significant relationship between disability and educational mismatch, which is surprising given, as they note, there are good reasons to expect the problem of overeducation to be more acute for the disabled.
In a similar manner to other minority groups, the presence of employer discrimination reduces the probability of employment, suggesting, therefore, that the disabled may be more likely to accept employment which does not fully utilise their skills or 4 qualifications. 3 A similar argument can also be made with regard to the unobserved productivity effect of a disability, which, by lowering productivity (for a given set of educational characteristics), would also reduce employment prospects. However, another argument used in the context of ethnic minorities by Battu and Sloane (2004) is that spatial constraints on job search increase the probability of educational mismatch. Constraints on job search for the disabled may actually be multidimensional, including not only in terms of geographical location, but also the physical (or emotional) demands of employment, hours of work and accessibility. All of these will mean the disabled are searching for a smaller pool of jobs and are more at risk of accepting 'mismatched' employment. 4 In this paper we make use of WERS 2004 to assess the incidence of over and underskilling for the disabled, differentiated according to whether or not the disability is work related, compared to the effect on the non-disabled. In short, we find that the disabled are more prone to both over and underskilling than the non-disabled. We consider the consequences of this skill mismatch on wages and job satisfaction and find the adverse effect of overskilling on wages is particularly acute for the worklimited disabled.
THE DATA
WERS 2004 is a cross-section data set involving a national sample of interviews with managers from 2,293 establishments with at least five workers. We define the work-limited as those who have positive responses to both questions.
Those who respond positively to the first, but not the second, question are defined as non-work-limited and those who do not have a long-term health problem form the non-disabled group. 6 This results in 11.9% of employees being classed as disabled, with 4.5% being work-limited and 7.4% non-work-limited. This is lower than previous estimates of the population share, consistent with the low rate of labour market participation among the disabled and this should be born in mind when considering the results presented in this paper.
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Employees were also asked a direct question about overskilling, the advantages of which, relative to the more typical measures of overeducation, are outlined by 5 Unfortunately, the cross sectional nature of the data means it is not possible to consider the dynamics or persistence of skill mismatch. However, Blazquez and Malo (2005) find that mismatch has particularly severe consequences for the disabled as they have a lower probability of leaving this state to become matched and have a higher probability of exiting this state to unemployment or inactivity. 6 Individuals should only answer the second question following a positive response to the first. A small number of mutually inconsistent responses are dropped from the analysis. Unfortunately, there is no further information about the nature of the disability which would enable us to control for productivity and work limitations more directly. 7 Given employees form the entire sample, it is not possible to control for sample selection bias that may arise as a result of this.
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and that required to do their job. 8 We do not attempt to estimate the extent of over and under-education in this paper. Though it is possible to impute it using the empirical method, a substantial number of respondents have other vocational qualifications, which are difficult to interpret in relation to their level. However, consistent with previous evidence (see, for example, , the disabled are significantly less likely to have a first degree, A levels or AS levels than the non-disabled and significantly more likely to have no academic qualifications (see Table 1 ).
Furthermore, the work-limited disabled are less well qualified than the non-worklimited disabled. These differences would reduce the likelihood of finding that overeducation was a more serious problem for the disabled. It is not possible, for example, to be overeducated if you have no qualifications, which is the case for roughly a quarter of the disabled.
The main limitation of our overskilling variable is that it is subjective, which means the responses of individuals may not be directly comparable. 9 However, there seems to be no obvious reason why disabled employees would consistently overestimate or underestimate their own skills or the demands of their employment relative to the non-disabled group. 10 The results in Table 2 show the disabled are significantly more likely to report having "much higher" skills than those required to do their job than the non-disabled and are significantly less likely to be matched. A greater proportion of the disabled also report being underskilled, but this sample is small and the 8 Overskilled includes much higher and a bit higher, whereas underskilled includes a bit lower and much lower. A complete list of descriptive statistics is contained in appendix table 1. 9 Overeducation has also been measured subjectively in most studies and there is no evidence that individuals exaggerate the extent to which the job requires the level of education they possess. 10 In fact, if statistical discrimination exists, one may argue that disabled employees, in particular, are better placed than their employers to assess their work skills and abilities. It is also important to note that if there is any (negative) influence of their disability on work skills and abilities then this does not imply underskilling, since job requirements also vary and individuals are asked about their present job.
7 differences are not significant. In Table 3 the mean values are presented for seven facets of job satisfaction (each measured on a scale where 5 is very satisfied to 1 very dissatisfied) and an index of overall satisfaction which combines each of them. 11 The disabled have a significantly lower index of job satisfaction than the non-disabled. For the work limited disabled this also applies to each of the seven facets of job satisfaction, but for the non-work-limited disabled satisfaction is significantly lower only in the case of training 12 and pay. This is despite the fact that hourly pay is actually higher for the non-work-limited disabled (£9.77) than for the non-disabled (£9.55). The work-limited disabled have significantly lower pay (£8.90) than the nondisabled. This emphasises the point that the differences between the non-work-limited disabled and the non-disabled are much less pronounced than the differences between the work-limited disabled and the non-disabled.
One other feature of the data is worth noting, since there is relatively limited evidence which documents more detailed information about the nature of disabled employment.
Regardless of the precise measure, the disabled report having less influence over their job. For example, 34.1% of the work-limited disabled report having little or no influence over the tasks you do in your job compared to 25.9% of the non-disabled; also, 23.1% of the work-limited disabled report having little or no influence over the 11 In this we follow Mumford and Smith (2008) who, using the same data set (but for a different purpose), calculated an aggregate measure of job satisfaction from six facets of job satisfaction by constructing a binary measure for each of them based on positive responses (satisfied or very satisfied) and summed them form a scaled index with values from 0 to 6. However, we use all seven facets of job satisfaction available in WERS. 12 Respondents were asked "apart from health and safety training how much training have you had during the last 12 months, either paid for or organised by your employer?" 43.9% of the work-limited disabled responded none compared to 36.2% of the non-disabled and the difference was significant at the 1% level. The work-limited disabled were also significantly less likely to have received training of between 2-5 days or more than 10 days than the non-disabled. There was no significant difference between the training provision for the non-work-limited disabled and the non-disabled. Thus, one of the potential causes of the higher rates of skill mismatch is the lower rates of job related training for the work-limited disabled.
8 order in which you carry out tasks compared to 17.0% of the non-disabled. The responses of the non-work-limited disabled are again more similar to the nondisabled.
9

METHODOLOGY (a) Determinants of mismatch
The first stage is to estimate the determinants of under-and overskilling, distinguishing between non-work-limited and work-limited disabled. Since there are three possibilities, the multinominal logit model seems appropriate. This estimates two sets of coefficients, 1 β (underskilled) and 3 β (overskilled). From these two sets of coefficients we can calculate the probability P ij of an individual i being underskilled (j=1) or overskilled (j=3) conditional on a vector of characteristics i x .
The probability of individual i being under-(over)-skill group j (relative to the probability of being in the default group 2 (skill matched)) is given by
with normalisation of B 2 to equal 0 to permit identification of the model, the probabilities are
WERS contains a rich set of covariates which, in addition to controls for disability status, include personal and workplace related characteristics. The controls for personal characteristics include gender, age, ethnicity (defined broadly as white or non-white), highest academic qualifications and marital status. We also control for work related characteristics including part-time employment, having a temporary contract, union membership, tenure, (log of) workplace size, whether the workplace is part of a larger organisation as well as sector, industry, occupation and region of work. All the estimates from the econometric models are unweighted; but, in order to check for consistency, we also run weighted regressions. Generally, these produce consistent results.
(b) Implications of mismatch on earnings and job satisfaction
Next, we establish whether being disabled or skill mismatched has a detrimental effect on earnings. Since usual gross weekly pay is banded into 14 groups, interval regression is the appropriate procedure, as the dependent variable is categorised and ordered and the cut-off points are known. Under such circumstances, OLS regressions using the mid-point of the pay band may generate inconsistent estimates (Stewart, 1983 ). In practice, OLS and the interval regression estimates produce very similar results so here we only present the former, which are easier to interpret. The midpoint of the pay band is adjusted for usual weekly hours to create a continuous measure of hourly pay. 14 The resulting earnings function is given by: We must, however, consider the nature of the matched employer -employee samples,
as there is both a within establishment error term variance and an across establishment error term variance. Under such circumstances, random effects GLS is a less biased indicator than OLS (see Moulton, 1987 ). We present, also, random effects results for each of the three groups separately -the non-disabled, the non-work-limited disabled, and the work-limited disabled.
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Finally, we estimate an ordered probit to explain the determinants of job satisfaction, using a composite index of overall job satisfaction. We assume that satisfaction is measured by an unobserved latent variable * i J which is determined by:
The observed response, J, will take the value 0 if
where K+1 is the number of alternative responses and k α are cut points. We include a set of personal and employment related controls, as well as the dummy variables for over-and under-skilling as determinants of job satisfaction. In a similar manner to the 15 The results are qualitatively similar, if instead, we control for workplace fixed effects.
analysis of earnings, we also control for unobserved workplace heterogeneity by estimating a random effects ordered probit model.
RESULTS
(a) Determinants of Mismatch
The disabled are significantly more likely to be mismatched than the non-disabled (Table 4) , the effect being stronger for the work-limited disabled as shown by the marginal effects in relation to underskilling, which is not significant for the non-worklimited disabled. The work-limited disabled are nearly 6 percentage points more likely to be overskilled than the non-disabled, which is consistent with a situation where it is harder for the disabled to obtain a job, such that they are prepared to trade-off higher skills for employment. 16 Obviously this argument does not explain the greater prevalence of underskilling, but this is also consistent with the disabled being more constrained in job search. 17 In contrast to the arguments of Frank (1978) , we find women are less likely to be mismatched than men. This may, however, reflect the self-assessed nature of our dependent variable and the greater tendency for men to overestimate their own skills and abilities (see, for example, Waldman, 1994) . Younger workers are more likely to be underskilled and less likely to be overskilled (though this is not reported in the   table) . Mismatch is also associated with shorter tenure and lower educational 16 Since both the work-limited and non-work-limited disabled have a higher probability of being overskilled, it suggests this is not entirely a consequence of differences in productivity but may reflect some discrimination against the entire disabled group. 17 It may also reflect a lack of employer sponsored training among the disabled. We did experiment by including training in the multinominal logit, but there is potential reverse causation, since the overskilled are less likely to be offered training. Its inclusion does not alter the main results discussed above.
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qualifications. However, vocational qualifications significantly increase the probability of being mismatched. Members of ethnic minorities are significantly more likely to be overskilled, again consistent perhaps with preparedness to trade-off skills to obtain a job. In contrast, single or married individuals, or those living with a partner, are less likely to be overskilled than those who are widowed, divorced or separated.
As regards to structural factors, overskilling is positively associated with working in a larger workplace where perhaps management -worker relations are less close and is less likely to be present in single establishments where similar considerations may apply in reverse. We also constructed an index of worker control over their jobs which combined the ability to influence tasks, the pace of work, how the individual does the work, the order of work and time of arrival and finish of work (e.g. flexitime). This index was found to have a strong negative impact on the probability of being overskilled and seems also to have important implications for the design of jobs.
Though not reported in Table 3 , the model includes a full set of controls for industry and occupation. Underskilling is significantly more prevalent in manufacturing, electricity, gas and water and public administration and less so in education than the omitted sector (other community services), while overskilling is significantly less prevalent in construction, financial services, other business services, education and 14 health. The more skilled the occupation the stronger the probability of underskilling and the lower the probability of overskilling.
(b)
The Effects on Earnings Table 5 presents the results of OLS and random effects earnings equations and columns (3-5) split the sample into non-disabled, non-work-limited disabled and work-limited disabled respectively. The non-work-limited disabled suffer no wage penalty as a result of their status, consistent with the absence of an unobserved productivity effect. However, there is a significant wage effect of around 5% for those who are work-limited disabled, being slightly smaller under random effects estimation. Similarly, there is no significant wage difference to being underskilled, but the overskilled suffer a significant wage reduction of around 3%, consistent with the reduced productivity of an overskilled individual relative to an otherwise identical individual who is better matched. When the sample is split, the penalty to being overskilled is about 2% for the non-disabled, 6% for the non-work-limited disabled and 10% for the work-limited disabled. This is not surprising since the extent of overskilling reported by the work-limited disabled is greater. However, even after controlling for the extent of overskilling, the disabled face a greater wage penalty from being in any given overskilled status. 19 The other variables behave as expected, but it is worth noting that the pay penalty for work-limited disabled women is less 18 We also experimented with the inclusion of the availability of equal opportunity policies for the disabled, whether there was monitoring of recruitment, promotion and pay of the disabled, whether the firm had made a formal assessment of the extent to which the workplace was accessible by the disabled and if the workplace had made adjustments to accommodate the disabled. Only the last of these significantly reduced the probability of being overskilled. 19 Results are not reported but specifications were estimated with separate controls for being severely and moderately overskilled. As expected the wage penalty is greater for the severely overskilled.
15 than for women in the other groups. 20 Further, the work-limited disabled suffer a much larger pay penalty for being employed in a single establishment employer and gain no pay benefit from being employed in the public sector. All groups benefit from an ability to control the nature of their work.
(c) Effects on Job Satisfaction
Few papers have considered the relationship between disability and job satisfaction. America. 21 In particular, Uppal (2005) finds that, even after controlling for personal characteristics, the disabled are less satisfied in work in Canada. In our case, the nonwork-limited disabled and the work-limited disabled have significantly lower job satisfaction than the non-disabled (Table 6 ) and, again, it is the work-limited who are worst off. 22 Both those who are underskilled and those who are overskilled have significantly lower job satisfaction than those who are properly matched, although the 20 The sole exception to this is the positive association between part-time work and hourly earnings. This appears to be a consequence of measurement error in reported hours of work. However, the key results discussed above are not sensitive to restricting the sample to full-time workers. 21 Disability and health are distinct concepts but may be correlated. We have no information on health to try and distinguish between the influence of health and disability on job satisfaction. 22 The other controls generally have the expected influence, with women and those with short tenure having higher satisfaction, whereas those with higher level academic qualifications, those on temporary contracts and those from ethnic minorities having lower job satisfaction. The ability to control one's own work has a highly significant positive impact on the level of job satisfaction. 
CONCLUSIONS
It is well known that the disabled are less likely to participate in the labour market than the non-disabled and those who do so suffer a pay penalty if they are worklimited disabled. In this paper we consider the possibility that the disabled may be more prone than the non-disabled to skill mismatch. This is, indeed, confirmed by our regression analysis, both with respect to underskilling and overskilling. We are able to confirm that there is a pay penalty to being disabled, but this is only significant for the work-limited disabled and there is an additional pay penalty to being overskilled (but not underskilled) which is larger for the disabled. Likewise, the disabled (particularly 23 An alternative specification was estimated with controls for the extent of overskilling and while being severely or moderately overskilled reduced the job satisfaction for non-disabled workers, for the work-limited disabled only severe overskilling that has a significant adverse effect on job satisfaction. 24 Again, we examined the robustness of the results to the inclusion of a control for the presence of equal opportunities policy for the disabled, but this appears to have no impact on the level of job satisfaction. Further, controlling for the level of hourly pay (which significantly raises job satisfaction) does not affect the above conclusions.
those who are work-limited) have lower job satisfaction than the non-disabled and skill mismatch further lowers job satisfaction.
Our results suggest that reducing the extent of this mismatch in the labour market would improve the earnings and satisfaction of disabled employees, the second of which has previously been found to be an important indicator of quit behaviour (Freeman, 1978) and may, therefore, aid government efforts to increase the employment rate among this group. Employers could be encouraged to assess the skills and abilities of disabled employees more formally, in order to reduce the extent of perceived skill mismatch. The evidence also suggests that giving workers greater discretion over how they perform their work tasks would have similar results. Greater flexibility for disabled employees in this respect would seem consistent with the reasonable adjustment element of the UK Disability Discrimination Act, as well as providing potential benefits to both employees and employers. '*' '**' '***' denote significance from the non-disabled group at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. With the exception of the index of satisfaction, figures are average job satisfaction scores on a ranked scale where 5=very satisfied and 1=very dissatisfied. The index of satisfaction is based on a total cumulative score from 0-7, with a higher score indicating higher job satisfaction. Model also includes controls for age, temporary contracts, parttime employment, presence of children and a full set of regional, occupational and industrial dummy variables which are not reported here. T statistics reported in parenthesis. '*', '**', '***' indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. The base category is having correctly matched skills. The figure in square brackets is a p-value based on the likelihood ratio test where the null hypothesis is that the slope coefficients are jointly equal to zero. Model also includes controls for age, temporary contracts, parttime employment and a full set of regional, occupational and industrial dummy variables which are not reported here. T statistics reported in parenthesis. '*', '**', '***' indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. The figures in square brackets are p-values based on the F-test or Wald test where the null hypothesis is that the slope coefficients are jointly equal to zero. 
